In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is potentially falsifiable, and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested. We then consider an application of our theoretical framework and assess whether the behavior of voters is consistent with sincere voting in U.S. national elections in the post-war period. We find that by and large sincere voting can explain virtually all of the individual-level observations on voting behavior in presidential and congressional U.S. elections in the data.
Introduction
Voting is a cornerstone of democracy and voters' decisions in elections and referenda are fundamental inputs in the political process that shapes the policies adopted by democratic societies. Hence, understanding observed patterns of voting represents an important step in the understanding of democratic institutions. Moreover, from a theoretical standpoint, voters are a fundamental primitive of political economy models. Different assumptions about their behavior have important consequences on the implications of these models and, more generally, on the equilibrium interpretation of the behavior of politicians, parties and governments they may induce. 1 An important question is whether voters vote "sincerely" based on their ideological views, or whether other factors (like for example strategic considerations, or their assessment of candidates' personal characteristics), determine the way individuals vote. Clearly, this is an empirical question and in order to address it we must first define what we mean by sincere voting.
Consider a situation where a group of voters is facing some contested elections (i.e., there is at least one election and two or more candidates in each election). Suppose that each voter and each candidate has political views that can be represented by a position in some common ideological (metric) space. We say that a voter votes sincerely in an election based on ideological considerations if she casts her vote in favor of the candidate whose ideological position is closest to her own (given the ideological positions of all the candidates in the election). 2 Given this definition, it follows immediately that if the ideological positions of all voters and candidates as well as the voting decisions of all voters were observable, we could then directly assess whether or not the behavior of each voter in any election is consistent with sincere voting. However, this is generally not the case. While there exist surveys containing 1 In the citizen-candidate framework, for example, equilibrium policies differ depending on how citizens vote (see, e.g., Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) ). The recent survey by Merlo (2006) presents a general overview of the implications of alternative theories of voting in political economy. 2 In this paper, we ignore the issue of abstention. For recent surveys of alternative theories of voter turnout see, e.g., Dhillon and Peralta (2002) and Merlo (2006) . information on how individuals vote in a number of elections (e.g., the American National Election Study, the Canadian National Election Study and the British Election Survey), and data sets containing measures of the ideological positions of politicians based on their observed behavior in a variety of public offices (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Hix, Nouri and Roland (2006) ), the ideological positions of voters are not directly observable. 3 The relevant empirical question thus becomes: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable (in a Popperian sense)? 4 This is the question we address in this paper. 5 The first result of our analysis is that using data only on how individuals vote in a single isolated election, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. Given any configuration of distinct candidates' positions, any observed vote can be rationalized by a voter voting sincerely based on some voter's ideological positions. This result holds for any number of dimensions of the ideological space.
Another result of our analysis is that using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections it is possible to construct a meaningful test of whether the behavior of voters is consistent with sincere voting. In other words, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely in multiple elections is potentially falsifiable, and we provide conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested. We show that in general environments where individual voting decisions and candidates' ideological positions are observable, but voters' ideological positions are not, the hypothesis that individuals vote sincerely in multiple elections with any number of candidates is falsifiable if the number of elections is greater than the number of 3 Note that in order to directly assess whether the behavior of voters is consistent with sincere voting one would need a consistent set of observations on the ideological positions of all voters and candidates in the same metric space. Hence, measures of citizens' self-reported ideological placements that are contained in some surveys (like, for example, the variable contained in the American National Election Studies, where voters are asked to place themselves on a 7-point liberal-conservative scale), cannot be used for this purpose, since, for instance, different people may interpret the scale differently. 4 See, e.g., Popper (1935 Scores, respectively. We find that by and large sincere voting can explain virtually all of the individual-level observations on voting behavior in presidential and congressional elections in the data. We also explore the robustness of these findings with respect to the choice of the number of elections and the number of dimensions of the ideological space. We conclude in Section 4 with some general remarks about the critical role played by auxiliary assumptions in testing voting theories.
Theoretical Analysis
Consider a situation where a group of voters N is facing m ≥ 1 simultaneous elections.
There is a common ideological space Y = R k , k ≥ 1, and let d (x, z) denote the Euclidean distance between any two points x, z ∈ R
Each voter i ∈ N is characterized by an ideological position y i ∈ Y . For any election e ∈ {1, ..., m}, let q e = |J e | ∈ {2, ..., q}, denote the number of candidates competing in the election, where J e is the set of candidates. Each candidate j ∈ {∪ m e=1 J e } is characterized by a distinct ideological position y j ∈ Y , which is known to the voters. Clearly, given the voting profiles of voters, if a researcher could observe the ideological positions of electoral candidates and of voters, it would be possible to directly establish whether or not each voter votes sincerely in each election. Suppose instead that a researcher has access only to limited information, and consider a situation where the researcher observes the voting profiles of voters and the ideological positions of electoral candidates, but does not observe the voters' ideological positions. We are interested in determining the conditions under which the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely could be potentially falsified, and is therefore testable.
For each voter
denote the primitives of the environment. We can now define the notion of falsifiability.
Definition 3: Given P , the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is falsifiable if there exists at least a voting profile v ∈ V m that is not consistent with sincere voting.
In the analysis that follows, we first consider the case of two-candidate elections, and then investigate the general case of elections with any number of candidates. 6 For example, if there are two elections, 1 and 2, with candidates a 1 and b 1 competing in election 1, and candidates a 2 and b 2 competing in election 2, the set of the four possible voting profiles is
Two-candidate elections
We begin our analysis by considering the case of two-candidate elections (i.e., q e = 2
for all e = 1, ..., m). For each election e ∈ {1, ..., m}, let y je , y
denote the ideological positions of the two candidates j e , e ∈ J e in the election, and let 
where y 0 denotes the transpose of y = (y 1 , ..., y k ). We can now state our first set of results.
Proposition 1: Given P , if q e = 2 for all e = 1, ..., m, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is falsifiable if m > k. If m ≤ k, the hypothesis is generically not falsifiable.
Corollary 1: Given P , the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely in a single election with two candidates is not falsifiable for all k ≥ 1.
All proofs are contained in the Appendix. 8 In order to illustrate the result that in twocandidate elections the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is falsifiable only if the number of elections is larger than the number of dimensions of the ideological space, consider an example in the two-dimensional space, Y = R 2 . In this case, each election implies a line that partitions the plane into two regions, and generically the lines implied by any two elections must intersect. It is should also be clear from the example that increasing the number of elections would increase the number of voting profiles that are inconsistent with sincere voting. In fact, the following proposition characterizes the upper bound on the number of voting profiles that are consistent with sincere voting (i.e., the number of regions r m ), as a function of the number of elections m and the number of dimensions of the ideological space k.
10
Proposition 2: Given P , if q e = 2 for all e = 1, ..., m, then r m ≤ ρ(m, k), where 
Multi-candidate elections
Consider now the general case where the number of candidates may vary across elections and any election may have more than two candidates (i.e., q e ∈ {2, ..., q}, e = 1, ..., m). For each election e ∈ {1, ..., m}, let y j e ∈ Y = R k , denote the distinct ideological position of a generic candidate j e ∈ J e in the election, and
e 6 = j e } be the set of points in the ideological space Y that are closer to y je than to the position of any other candidate in the election. We can now state our second set of results.
Proposition 3: Given P , the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely in a single election with any number of candidates is not falsifiable for all k ≥ 1.
Proposition 3 generalizes Corollary 1. In order to illustrate the result consider the following example in the two-dimensional space, Y = R 2 . Figure 3 depicts a situation where there is a single election e = 1, and the set of candidates in the election is and any number of dimensions of the ideological space.
Proposition 4: Given P , if q e ∈ {2, ..., q}, e = 1, ..., m, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is falsifiable if m > k.
When the number of elections is greater than the number of dimensions of the ideological space, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is always falsifiable regardless of the number of candidates in each election. Hence, Proposition 4 extends the result of the first part of Proposition 1. However, for the case where 1 < m ≤ k, while the hypothesis is generically not falsifiable when each election has two candidates, when there are more than two candidates in at least one election, this is no longer the case. In fact, there exist configurations of candidates' positions, {y j } j∈ { ∪ m e=1 J e } , such that the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is falsifiable, and configurations such that the hypothesis is not falsifiable.
In order to illustrate this result consider the following example in the two-dimensional space, Y = R 2 . Suppose that in addition to election 1 depicted in Figure 3 , there is a second election with two candidates (i.e., e ∈ {1, 2}, q 1 = 3 and q 2 = 2). The set of candidates in election 2 is J 2 = {a 2 , b 2 }, and the candidates' ideological positions are such that for each When the ideological space is either one-or two-dimensional (i.e., k ≤ 2), we can also characterize the upper bound on the number of voting profiles that are consistent with sincere voting (i.e., the number of regions r m ), as a function of the number of elections m and the number of candidates in each election, q 1 , ..., q m .
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Proposition 5: Given P , if k ≤ 2, then r m ≤ τ k (m, q 1 , ..., q m ), where
and
(q e − 1)
Note that if m = 1, 3 Evidence from U.S. National Elections
In the previous section, we have characterized general conditions under which the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is falsifiable. We now turn our attention to assessing empirically the extent to which, in environments where the hypothesis is falsifiable, the observed behavior of voters is consistent with sincere voting. Our empirical analysis is simply meant as an illustration of the theoretical framework presented above, and focuses on national elections in the United States between 1970 and 2000. The same analysis, however, can also be replicated for other countries, or other types of elections, or other time periods for which there are available data. 13 The issue we are considering corresponds to the problem of counting the number of regions in arrangements of Voronoi tessellations in k-dimensional Euclidean space. This problem has not yet been studied in computational and combinatorial geometry, and there are no known results in the literature.
Since, as shown in Section 2, this empirical analysis is meaningful only if we have access to data on how individuals vote in multiple elections, we consider the situation faced by U.S. voters in a presidential election year (henceforth, an election year), where presidential and congressional elections occur simultaneously. 14 In any election year, U.S. voters elect the President and, at the same time, each voter faces an election that determines the representative of his or her district in the House of Representatives. 15 Some voters also face a Senate election in their state. 16 Each election is typically contested by two candidates belonging to the Democratic and the Republican party, respectively.
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Since the set of candidates competing for a seat in the House of Representatives is different in each congressional district, our unit of analysis is the district. In a generic election year t, a voter i residing in district h ∈ {1, ..., 435} and state s ∈ {1, ..., 50} faces a House election.
Let J h t denote the set of candidates competing in the House election in congressional district h at time t. Like all other voters in the nation, voter i also faces a presidential election, and let J p t denote the set of presidential candidates at time t. If a Senate seat is up for election in state s at time t, then voter i also faces a Senate election, where the set of candidates is J s t . Hence, in any given district h = 1, ..., 435 in state s = 1, ..., 50, a voter i is facing either two or three simultaneous elections, and elections is four years. We refer to an election year where both presidential and congressional elections occur simultaneously as a presidential election year. 15 Citizens who reside in the District of Columbia do not elect a House representative but only a congressional delegate. 16 Senate elections are staggered, and in any given election year, there are elections to the U.S. Senate in approximately one third of the states. In addition, many voters also face other local elections and referenda.
Since data on how individuals vote in these elections is typically not available, we do not consider them here. 17 In some elections a single candidate runs uncontested. Occasionally, a third, independent candidate also runs. Since data on the positions of independent candidates is not available, in our analysis, we restrict attention to two-candidate presidential and congressional elections. 20 We restrict attention to the period 1970-2000, and consider seven election years : 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996 , and 2000. 21 For each year, Table 1 Rosenthal. 21 The NES data for the election year 1992 contains a mistake in the variable that identifies the con-observations in the NES sample of individuals who reported how they voted in the presidential and House elections, as well as in the sub-sample of individuals who were also facing a senatorial election in their state, and reported how they voted in the presidential, House, and Senate elections. 
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For all the cases where we observe the positions of all the candidates competing in the elections faced by the voters residing in a district, following the analysis in Section 2, we gressional district of residence of the individuals in the sample (see ftp://ftp.nes.isr.umich.edu/ftp/nes/ studypages/1992prepost/int1992.txt). Hence, it cannot be used for the purpose of our analysis. 22 Obviously, we only consider congressional elections that are contested, and observations for which the voters' district and state of residence are not missing. we consider instead all possible realizations of these candidates' positions (that is, all the points in the support of the relevant empirical distributions of candidates' positions), and determine whether for any of these positions each observed individual voting profile in that district is consistent with sincere voting. 25 The outcome of our calculations is the fraction of the observed individual voting profiles that are consistent with sincere voting in each election year.
In order to perform these calculations, we need to specify the number of elections m we consider, and the number of dimensions of the ideological space k (where it has to be the case that m > k). We begin by ignoring Senate elections, 26 and evaluate the extent to which the observed voting behavior of all individuals in the NES samples who voted in the presidential and House elections is consistent with sincere voting when we restrict attention to a unidimensional liberal-conservative ideological space. 27 We then take into consideration that while some voters only face the presidential and a House election, some voters also face a Senate election, and evaluate the extent to which the observed behavior of voters in presidential and congressional (House or House and Senate) elections is consistent with sincere voting, while still maintaining the assumption of a unidimensional ideological space.
Finally, we restrict attention to the sub-samples of individuals in the NES who voted in three elections (presidential, House, and Senate), and perform our calculations for the case where 25 Note that since we are assuming that voters know the true position of each candidate, for all voters in the same district (state) we assess whether their observed voting profiles are consistent with sincere voting using the same realizations of candidates' positions in their district (state). 26 Most empirical studies of voting in national U.S. elections that use NES data restrict attention to presidential and House elections (e.g., Alvarez and Schousen (1993), Burden and Kimball (1998), and Mebane (2000)). 27 In particular, we only consider the first dimension of the Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE scores. Note that according to Poole and Rosenthal (1997; p.5) , "from the late 1970s onward, roll call voting became largely a matter of positioning on a single, liberal-conservative dimension." the ideological space is two-dimensional. 28 Table 2 contains our results, where each column corresponds to one of the three scenarios.
As we can see from the first column in Table 2 , sincere voting can explain virtually all of the individual-level observations on voting behavior in presidential and House elections in the data. Its worst "failure" amounts to the inability of accounting for 5.1% of the observations in 1980. Overall, by combining all the samples in the seven election years we consider, we have that only 3.3% of the observed individual voting profiles are not consistent with sincere voting. Note that "errors" of this magnitude are within the margin of tolerance when one allows for sampling (or measurement) error.
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Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 help us to assess the robustness of these findings with respect to the choice of the number of elections and the number of dimensions of the ideological space. From the analysis in Section 2, we know that given the number of dimensions of the ideological space, an increase in the number of elections increases the number of voting profiles that cannot be rationalized by a voter voting sincerely in these elections. This increases the extent to which the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely may fail to explain the data.
Consistent with this result, we find that increasing the number of elections while maintaining the dimensionality of the ideological space fixed, worsens the empirical performance of the elections only fails to account for less than 1% of the observations in each of the seven election years we consider (Column 3). We conclude that a compelling case cannot be made on empirical grounds to dismiss a sincere-voting interpretation of the behavior of voters in U.S. 28 Recall that the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely in presidential and House elections only is not
29 One potential source of measurement error in the data, for example, is that individuals in the NES samples may be assigned to the wrong congressional district (a possibility that arises whenever the location where an individual is interviewed does not correspond to his or her permanent residence).
national elections.
A prominent feature that emerges from the data is that often people vote a "split ticket"
(that is, they vote for candidates of different parties for President and for Congress). 30 The sizeable presence of split-ticket voting in the data has been interpreted by many as direct evidence of strategic voting, and has lead to the development of strategic-voting models that can explain some of the aggregate stylized facts. 31 Our findings indicate that by and large split-ticket voting is also consistent with sincere voting. 31 See, e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal (1996) and Chari, Jones and Marimon (1997).
32 Note that our analysis is not a test of "sincere vs. strategic" voting. The objective of the quantitative exercise is simply to assess the extent to which observed voting behavior is consistent with individuals voting sincerely, given our definition of sincere voting provided in Section 2.
that tries to assess the performance of the sincere-voting hypothesis are therefore conditional on these maintained assumptions. In particular, a "statistically significant failure" to explain the data may lead to a rejection of the hypothesis. This failure, however, may simply be due to limitations of the auxiliary assumptions, and could also be interpreted as grounds for rejecting these assumptions instead. It is therefore important to consider alternative specifications of the environment that correspond to different sets of auxiliary assumptions surrounding the main hypothesis that is being tested. The same considerations apply to testing any alternative theory of voting using the same data.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Let q e = 2 for all e ∈ {1, ..., m}. We first show that for all k ≥ 1 
where
Since generically the vectors λ e = (λ 
is the unique solution to
Consider the linear transformation
that maps Y into X (where Y = R k and X = R k ). This transformation maps each hyperplane H j in Y , j = 1, ..., k, into the j th coordinate of X, and y * into the origin of X. For m ≤ k the first part of the proof of Proposition 1 implies that
Furthermore, it maps each hyperplane
Hence, we only need to prove the case m > k. The proof is by induction on the number of dimensions of the ideological space, k. The assertion is trivial in one dimension, where m points-that is, 0-dimensional hyperplanes-partition R into at most m + 1 intervals-that is, 1-regions (where the "at most" qualifier follows from the fact that although the positions of all candidates are distinct, the mid-points between any pairs of candidates, one pair in each election, may coincide). Thus, assume that the assertion holds for all dimensions less than k.
Any k hyperplanes intersect in at most one point in R k (and generically in exactly one point). Hence, 
To complete the proof we count the number of k-regions in A with q e ∈ {2, ..., q} candidates implies (q e − 1) points that partition the line into q e regions.
Hence, starting from the case of no elections, where the number of regions in R is 1, adding each election e = 1, ..., m one at the time increases the number of regions by at most (q e − 1).
Now consider the case where k = 2. Then each election e ∈ {1, ..., m} defines a Voronoi diagram in the plane with q e regions. Note that, given any collection of Voronoi diagrams that partitions the plane into Q regions, if we superimpose an additional diagram with q j regions, the total number of regions becomes Q + (q j − 1) + n, where n is the number of intersection points of the edges of the additional Voronoi diagram with the edges of the other diagrams.
Let the union of the edges of the Voronoi diagram defined by election e be denoted by U e , e = 1, ..., m. Then for each pair of elections, e, f ∈ {1, ..., m}, e 6 = f , the cardinality n of the intersection of U e and U f is at most (q e − 1)(q f − 1). To see that this is the case, note that the number of regions in the superimposition of the two Voronoi diagrams is at most q e q f .
But, as noted above, it is also equal to q e + (q f − 1) + n. It follows that n ≤ (q e − 1)(q f − 1). 
Starting with the

